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Governing Terrorism through Risk: taking precautions, (un)knowing 
the future1 
  
Abstract 
 
9/11 appeared to make good on Ulrich Beck’s claim that we are now living in a (global) 
risk society. Examining what it means to ‘govern through risk’, this article departs from 
Beck’s thesis of risk society and its appropriation in security studies. Arguing that the 
risk society thesis problematically views risk within a macro-sociological narrative of 
modernity, this paper shows, based on a Foucauldian account of governmentality, that 
governing terrorism through risk involves a permanent adjustment of traditional forms of 
risk management in light of the double infinity of catastrophic consequences and the 
incalculability of the risk of terrorism. Deploying the Foucauldian notion of ‘dispositif’, 
this article explores precautionary risk and risk analysis as conceptual tools that can shed 
light on the heterogeneous practices that are defined as the ‘war on terror’.  
 
Keywords: terrorism; governmentality; risk society; precaution; securitisation; 
governmentality 
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I Introduction 
 
We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less 
decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded … I 
believe the time is ripe for a hard look at fundamental policy issues, and 
at the structural changes that may be needed in order to strengthen them. 
History is a harsh judge: it will not forgive us if we let this moment pass    
(Anan, 2003) 
 
Kofi Anan’s statement speaks of a shared feeling in the post-9/11 world. Novel and 
exceptional, 9/11 had all the qualifications of a historic ‘event’. The world of IR 
attempted however to mould this dramatic novelty to fit its already existing tools: just 
war, preemptive action, or even civilisational clashes. More radical engagements with 
state practices post-9/11 brought about an analytical mixture of continuity through the 
construction of otherness and exceptional practices and discontinuity through the 
intensification and increased visibility of these practices. Yet, the ‘war on terror’ is a 
more complex discursive and institutional formation than these theories have been able to 
account for, configured by practices that are neither exclusively nor predominantly 
military, a specific imbrication of continuity and discontinuity. From Guantanamo Bay to 
biometrics and increased surveillance, or from extraordinary rendition to the 
categorisation of terrorist suspects as enemy combatants, the ‘war on terror’ has 
regimented a whole series of practices that do not fall under the description of war. More 
attentive to the radical novelty of terrorism, the work of the German sociologist Ulrich 
Beck saw in terrorism another manifestation of ‘world risk society’ (Beck, 2002; see also 
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Coker, 2002b; Rasmussen, 2004; Spence, 2005). Comparing the terrorist attacks of 
September 11 with the Chernobyl of the 1980s (Beck, 2002; 2003), Beck has claimed that 
September 11 drove home the lesson that we now live in a ‘risk society’, a society in 
which there are uncontrollable and unpredictable dangers against which insurance is 
impossible. Beck’s view on terrorism as a risk that goes ‘beyond rational calculation into 
the realm of unpredictable turbulence’ (Beck, 2002: 43) has also motivated security 
scholars to reconsider the research agenda of security studies (Rasmussen, 2001; 2004; 
Griner, 2002). As Rasmussen argues, ‘[t]he attack on the World Trade Centre in 
September 2001 is a tragic example of a new asymmetrical strategic reality that is better 
understood by the concept of risk society than by traditional notions of terrorism’ 
(Rasmussen, 2001: 308).  
 Beck’s risk society is not the first formulation of the need to think security in 
terms of risk. An earlier debate tried to open the concept of ‘securitisation’ as formulated 
by the Copenhagen School to risk analysis. Against the limitation of securitisation to 
urgency, immediacy, survival, or exceptional practices, Didier Bigo proposed an 
understanding of securitisation as routinised practices of bureaucracies.2 An attention to 
practices and routines translated to an attention to risk management, to the proactive 
practices of security professionals to prevent the occurrence of dangers in the future 
(Bigo, 2004b: 1). While we agree that the concept of risk provides a useful way of 
analysing security practices in the ‘war on terror’, we argue that Beck’s understanding of 
risks, formulated in the context of environmental struggles in Germany in the 1970s, 
pertains to a specific approach to modernisation and the role of knowledge that does not 
travel well to the current practices and technologies of risk deployed in the war on terror. 
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Although Beck presents risk society as riddled with risks of which we can have neither 
knowledge nor measure, the ‘war on terror’ displays an insatiable quest for knowledge: 
profiling populations, surveillance, intelligence, knowledge about catastrophe 
management, prevention, etc. Therefore, this article takes issue with the particular 
conceptualisation of risk that is being appropriated from Beck and explores the potential 
of another approach to risk analysis to make sense of what security entails in the context 
of the ‘war on terror’.3 While it is problematic to argue, as Beck does, that all practices of 
security can be reduced to one type of risk, the ‘war on terror’ can also not be reduced to 
practices of proactive risk management as analysed by Didier Bigo. We argue that the 
‘war on terror’ is a new form of governmentality that imbricates knowledge and decision 
at the limit of knowledge, war and strategies of surveillance, injunctions to integration 
and drastic policies against anti-social behaviour. What is new is not so much the advent 
of a risk society as the emergence of a ‘precautionary’ element that has given birth to new 
configurations of risk that require that the catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided 
at all costs.  
We contend that a different conceptualisation of risk as ‘precautionary risk’ can 
shed light on the contradictory and complex developments of the post-9/11 world. 
Following Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality and more recent social analyses 
of risk, we conceptualise risk as a dispositif for governing social problems.4 
Governmentality has been broadly defined as the ‘conduct of conduct’ or the social 
practices that attempt to shape, guide or affect the behaviour of persons (Gordon, 1991). 
Governmentality as an analysis of representations of social problems, the means to 
remedy them and their effects on the construction of subjectivity has informed a series of 
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approaches in International Relations. Globalisation (Larner and Walters, 2004; 
Lipschutz and Rowe, 2005), Europeanisation (Barry, 1993; Walters and Haahr, 2005) 
security (Dillon, 1996; Huysmans, 2004a; Bigo, 2002b), development (Brigg, 2001), 
complex emergencies (Dillon and Reid, 2001), refugee regimes (Lippert, 1999) or human 
trafficking (Aradau, 2004a) have all been explored through a governmental perspective. 
The dispositif of risk as a heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and material elements 
will enable us to locate developments as diverse as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
targeting of Muslim communities by counter-terrorism measures or indefinite detention 
of suspect terrorists in the UK as elements of precautionary governance through risk. 
Rather than bellicose decisions or arbitrary executive measures, these different policies 
will be shown to function within a dispositif of precautionary risk.  
To this purpose, we shall proceed in three stages. Firstly, Beck’s theory of risk 
society and its problematic appropriation in security studies will be revisited. Secondly, 
we shall discuss an analysis of risk that privileges heterogeneity over homogeneity, 
constructivism over realism, and contingency over determinism. This analysis of risk is 
‘governmental’, inasmuch as it sees risk as rationalities and technologies that have 
developed and diversified historically in order to deal with social problems. Thirdly, the 
deployment of the dispositif of precautionary risk in the war on terror will be explored. 
By way of conclusion we shall discuss some of the implications of our analysis for 
(critical) security studies.  
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II Security studies: Living in the risk society 
 
Security studies have recently – though belatedly – discovered Beck’s analysis of risk 
society. In search for conceptual tools that can make sense of what security means and 
does nowadays, security analysts have hailed the risk society thesis as the promise for a 
renewed understanding of the world. Today, or so the argument goes, we all live in a 
(global) risk society. Beck argues that contemporary Western societies have undergone a 
transition from industrial societies to risk societies. The main difference between these 
two phases of the modernisation process is the way in which risks are perceived. In the 
industrial society, the foremost objective of decision-making is to produce and distribute 
wealth in conditions of scarcity. The reigning idea about risks was that they were the 
unintended, latent side effects of industrialisation that could be tamed through risk 
compensation and insurance schemes that worked on the basis of scientific expertise and 
calculations. In the (global) risk society, this relationship is reversed. The onus of 
decision-making is no longer on the production and distribution of ‘goods’, but on the 
prevention of ‘bads’. Technological and industrial progress has led to a situation where 
risks can no longer be conceived as the manageable side-effects of growth. 
At the centre of risk society lies the consciousness that risks such as global 
warming, pollution and the hole in the ozone layer have become so immense that they 
create social and political dynamics that radically contradict the language of control in 
industrial societies. On the one hand, risks in risk society have become impossible to 
predict, either because of their low statistical probability or because they are non-
recurring. On the other hand, these low-probability risks have hazardous effects that 
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cannot be compensated for through existing schemes of (financial) compensation. They 
are, as Beck puts it, ‘irreversible threats to the life of plants, animals and human beings’ 
(Beck, 1992: 13). 
The advent of risk society is intimately related to Beck’s notion of reflexive 
modernisation. The existence of irreversible risks in itself is not sufficient ground to 
speak of the emergence of a risk society. Indeed, Beck maintains that it is the social 
awareness of the catastrophic impacts of risks that defines the threshold between 
industrial society and risk society:  
 
The concept of risk is directly bound to the concept of reflexive 
modernization. Risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself. 
Risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the 
threatening force of modernization and to its globalization of doubt. They 
are politically reflexive (Beck, 1992: 21). 
 
Reflexivity is a form of self-critique and self-transformation that emerges in the advent of 
uncontrollable risks. It refers to the situation where societies have come to see themselves 
as risk societies, that is, as societies in which public debate and political conflicts are 
shaped by the awareness of irreversible risks and their impact upon the foundations of 
modern industrial societies.  
More specifically, Beck accounts how the world of industrial societies and 
calculable risks has been dislocated along three dimensions: spatial, temporal and social 
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(Beck, 2002: 41). Risk society is ultimately a world risk society with no hiding places 
from delocalised risks with consequences that stretch over extended, or even indefinite, 
periods of time (Beck, 1996; 1999). Most interestingly, Beck argues that these 
uninsurable risks undermine the social arrangements through which risks have been made 
controllable in the past. Control is no longer possible in risk society, which instead 
‘balances its way along beyond the limits of insurability’ (Beck, 1999: 32). When risks 
take the form of low-probability/high-consequence risks, questions of compensation, 
liability, and harm minimisation lose their significance. While Beck is rather vague about 
what kind of risks to include, moving from the earlier ‘manufactured’ risks such as 
pollution to ‘intentional’ risks such as terrorism and financial risks such as economic 
crises, his general point of departure seems to be that in conditions of extreme 
uncertainty, decision-makers are no longer able to guarantee predictability, security and 
control. ‘[T]he hidden central issue in world risk society’, he argues, ‘is how to feign 
control over the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, technology, economy and 
everyday life’ (Beck, 2002: 41, emphasis added). Control is ideological, doomed to fall 
short of the measure of reality. 
Following Beck’s evolutionary account of the two phases of modernity, 
Rasmussen (2004) similarly claims that in the war on terror the ideal of complete security 
is being replaced by a focus on the management of risks in conditions of uncertainty. 
However, while the introduction of the concept of risk in security studies is a valuable 
way of moving the debate about the meaning of security forward, its heavy reliance on 
Beck’s framework of risk society is not without difficulties. More specifically, two sets 
problems can be identified with the thesis of risk society. The first is empirical and refers 
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to the difficulty of locating a threshold between early modernity and reflexive modernity, 
which in turn renders problematic the claim that today we live in a world risk society. 
Although Beck in his more recent writings has somewhat moved away from the notion 
that ‘it makes no sense to insure against the worst-case ramifications of the global spiral 
of threat’ (Beck, 1999: 142), he still maintains that private insurance has become obsolete 
in risk society, as no private companies would be willing to bear the costs of future 
catastrophes such as terrorist attacks (Beck, 2002: 44). In times of crises, he argues, the 
neo-liberal ethos of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation gives way to sovereign 
state power, as ‘the power of definition of experts has been replaced by that of states and 
intelligence agencies; and the pluralisation of expert rationalities has turned into the 
simplification of enemy images’ (Beck, 2002: 45).  
At first sight, Beck’s observations on the uninsurability and incalculability of risk 
seem to have some empirical value. Barely a month after the attacks of 11 September, the 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of 
the US House of Representatives met up to deal with the fall-out in the insurance and 
reinsurance industries (Cooper, 2004). Although most of these losses were borne by re-
insurers (Ericson and Doyle, 2004), the Subcommittee discussed recommendations for 
the wholesale restructuring of private insurance. The insurance industry itself vigorously 
lobbied the US government to provide a bailout measure that would designate the 
government as the last resort re-insurer of terrorism risk. In his congressional testimony, 
Richard J. Hillman of the US General Accounting Office claimed that ‘both insurers and 
re-insurers have determined that terrorism is not an insurable risk at this time’ (cited in 
Kunreuther, 2002: 427). In 2002, accordingly, the US Senate passed the 2002 Terrorism 
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Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which effectively regulates government involvement in the 
compensation of insured losses. While there has been a drift from private to public 
insurance arrangements, the private industry remains a significant insurer in the post-9/11 
environment. The TRIA is only intended as a temporary bailout measure and states 
explicitly that in the future terrorism insurance should be provided for by the private 
sector:   
 
[T]he United States Government should provide temporary financial 
compensation to insured parties, contributing to the stabilization of the 
United States economy in a time of national crisis, while the financial 
services industry develops the systems, mechanisms, products, and 
programs necessary to create a viable financial services market for private 
terrorism risk insurance (US Congress, 2002, Sec. 101(6)). 
 
The argument that catastrophic terrorism is incalculable and uninsurable appears 
therefore inattentive to the institutional measures and actions that surround the tragic 
events of 9/11. Against the backdrop of radical contingency and incalculability, 
institutions have attempted to devise means to minimise or avoid the catastrophic promise 
of the future, seeking for alternative ways to predict and master it. Indeed, as Bougen has 
shown, terrorism and other catastrophic risks (including natural catastrophes and ‘man-
made’ ones) are actually insured by private insurance companies (Bougen, 2003). 
Departing from Beck’s sweeping assumption that risk society is an uninsurable society, 
risk analysis should instead focus on ‘the variety of ways in which catastrophe risks are 
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already being governed in this new environment’ (O'Malley, 2003a: 276). Yet, the major 
role that the insurance industry has played in redefining terrorism and the post-9/11 
vision of the future has been relegated outside the boundaries of IR even if the OECD has 
recently reviewed market evolutions and existing national arrangements to cover 
exposure to terrorism and other catastrophic risks (OECD, 2005b, 2005a).  
Since introducing theories of risk into IR should allow us to understand how 
various institutional actors respond to terrorism and other global risks, it is not clear how 
a theory of risk based on an evolutionary understanding of modernity can explicate the 
risk technologies deployed in the war on terror. Contrary to the thesis of risk society, the 
fact that ‘Western governments simply are much less certain of whether and when they 
are secure, and how – and to what extent and at what price – security can be achieved’ 
(Rasmussen, 2004: 382) does not in itself entail specific technologies of risk to deal with 
uncertainty. The problem with the risk society thesis is that it fails to acknowledge that 
the identification of risk is not the same as recognising the uncertainty of future events 
(Luhmann, 1991).5 On the contrary, the identification and management of risk is a way of 
organising reality, disciplining the future, taming chance and rationalising individual 
conduct (Werner, 2005). Hence, ‘reflexivity’ in the sense of social awareness of risks has 
been a constant characteristic of governmental processes. Not the threshold of risk 
society, reflexivity is characteristic of all processes of governing the future, including 
security (Albert, 2001: 66-67). Rather than non-reflexive practices somehow 
characteristic of pre-risk society, security studies have read mutual deterrence (the arms-
race, the development of second-strike capabilities) as insuring the present against a full 
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exposure to an uncertain future. What is different, however, are the manifold ways in 
which the future can be assessed, calculated and mastered. 
This brings us to the second problem with the risk society thesis. As the 
conceptualisation of risk is intrinsically linked to a macro-historical account of history, 
Beck wrongly assumes that risks have the same features independent of the sphere in 
which they are articulated (e.g., environment, medicine, security, energy, the clinic). Risk 
is viewed as something given in the world and not as something constructed. Post-
industrial society is laden with catastrophic risks as a result of concrete technological 
developments. Risk is not a modality of approaching reality, of inscribing social 
problems as risk, but what happens in the world ‘out there’ (cf. Dean, 1999; Lupton, 
1999; Mythen and Walklate, 2005). It should be stressed, however, that others have 
pointed out that a more constructivist reading of Beck is possible as well (Rasmussen, 
2001: 292, fn. 32).6 According to Beck himself, “[t]he decision whether to take a realist 
or constructivist approach is … a rather pragmatic one … I am both a realist and 
constructivist” (Beck, 2000b: 211-2). With this somewhat puzzling statement Beck 
means to say that while risks are out there (realist ontology), it depends upon cultural, 
subjective and social categories which risks are selected for treatment (constructivist 
epistemology) (Beck, 2000b: 219). Hence, cultural selection is posited as an intervening 
variable between material risks on the one hand and the response to them on the other.7 
Social construction is only a secondary process and the constructivist elements of 
interpretational struggles or solidarity-creation are ‘merely’ an addition to a positivist 
world of ‘really existing risks’.8 Concomitantly, IR-theorists who have used the risk 
society framework have examined how transnational loyalties are constituted around a 
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common interest in the management of global risks (Coker, 2002a; Griner, 2002; 
Rasmussen, 2004; Spence, 2005).  
This view of catastrophic risks as something given denies the existence of other 
notions of risk and precludes any substantial analysis of the ways in which governing by 
means of risk has changed over time as it has become attached to different types of 
knowledges, rationalities, techniques and locales. An analysis of catastrophic risks is also 
limited to three categories, namely economic, environmental, and terrorist. The 
framework of global risk society could not accommodate crime, migration, or human 
trafficking, as risks are supposed to emerge from a technical decision and culturally 
selected only later on.9 Organised crime or everyday muggings for example become risks 
through the way they are rendered knowledgeable and thinkable as well as through the 
technologies that are mobilised to tackle and manage them. Moreover, Beck’s analytical 
dichotomy between incalculable risk/pretence of control by the authorities seems to be 
overturned in these cases. The risks of crime or migration are brandished as 
uncontrollable and catastrophic by the authorities themselves. Rather than focusing on 
these phenomena which become risk through an inscription of response to specific social 
problems, we shall focus on terrorism as the hard case of a governmental 
conceptualisation of risk contra Beck’s risk society. 
Although post-9/11 terrorism appears to lend itself logically to Beck’s paradigm 
of catastrophe and uncontrollability, discoveries of social problems always presuppose 
contestation over the means to deal with them. As Mitchell Dean has shown, risks have 
often been made ‘calculable’ through qualitative, non-quantifiable and non-scientific 
forms of knowledge (Dean, 1999: 189). This is also the case for the risk of terrorism, 
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which is increasingly made ‘calculable’ through speculation and gambling instead of 
probability and severity (Ericson and Doyle, 2004: 137). Rather than assuming that risks 
have become incalculable under the conditions of reflexive modernity, that we are now 
living in a global risk society as Beck’s title of a recent lecture at the London School of 
Economics indicates (Beck, 2006), we analyse risk as ordering our world through 
managing social problems and surveying populations. Such a governmental analysis of 
risk is able to expose how the world and existing problematisations are made into risks, 
what effects this form of ordering entails upon populations. It is also able to understand 
changes in the modes of governing through risk depending on representations of the 
problem at hand and the subjects to be governed. 
 
III Governing the risk society: From insurance to precaution 
 
Rather than a homogeneous development of industrial modernity, risk can be understood 
as a dispositif to govern social problems in Michel Foucault’s sense of the term. A 
dispositif consists of ‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions’ (Foucault, 1980: 194). The heterogeneous elements that make 
up a dispositif can be understood more systematically as rationalities and technologies of 
government.10 In modernity, all forms of government have attempted to ‘rationalise’ 
themselves, to account for the ‘authority of their authority’. Rationalities appear therefore 
as knowledgeable discourses that represent objects of knowledge, confer identities and 
agencies upon social and political actors, and identify problems to be solved (Dean and 
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Hindess, 1998). Put simply, rationalities are ways of thinking about a social problem that 
will make its management practicable. Technologies are the means of realisation of 
rationalities, the social practices which are aimed at manipulating the social and physical 
world according to identifiable routines (O'Malley, 1992: 269, fn. 2). Governmental 
rationalities and technologies affect behaviour and ‘construct’ forms of ordered agency 
and subjectivity in the population to be governed as part of the social problem identified.  
In this analysis, risk is a multiform and heterogeneous combination of rationalities 
and technologies, a ‘family of ways of thinking and acting, involving calculations about 
probable futures in the present followed by interventions into the present in order to 
control that potential future’ (Rose, 2001: 7). A dispositif of risk creates a specific 
relation to the future, which requires the monitoring of the future, the attempt to calculate 
what the future can offer and the necessity to control and minimise its potentially harmful 
effects. Thus a dispositif of risk goes beyond the ecological, economic, and terror risks 
identified by Beck to link in a continuum everyday, ordinary, everyday risks such as 
crime risks and extraordinary and catastrophic risks such as terror risks.  
A dispositif of risk is subject to transformation and modification, depending on 
the knowledgeable representations of the problems and objects to be governed and on the 
available technologies to produce particular effects in the governed. Risk inscribes reality 
as harbouring ‘potential dangerous irruptions’ (Castel, 1991: 288) and deploys 
technologies to avert these events in the future. As risk has been thought for a long time 
to be coextensive with the insurable  (Ewald, 1986), it has been shunned by security 
studies. Traditional security studies could not fit a logic of insurance within their 
definition of danger and the military techniques to neutralise these dangers. Constructivist 
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approaches such as the Copenhagen School have looked at the performative naming of 
security and could not therefore identify techniques and rationalities of risk if not 
explicitly named as such.11 Bigo has introduced a risk approach in security studies by 
analysing how the managers of unease use the ‘authority of statistics’ to classify and 
prioritise the threats and determine what exactly constitutes security (Bigo, 2004a). As 
the police for example make use of insurantial knowledge, statistics and profiling for the 
purposes of prevention, risk entered the remit of security. Security is therefore not only 
about the exceptional, that which threatens survival and goes beyond normal politics, but 
about everyday routines and technologies of security professionals.12 It also relies on 
what Beck would dismiss as the ‘ideological formation of risk’, as the pretence of 
professionals that risks can be controlled against their intrinsic incalculability and 
unpredictability.  
What happens however when the authority of knowledge and statistical 
technologies become insufficient or are surpassed by catastrophic events? Risk 
understood as a dispositif for governing possible future irruptions of social problems 
offers an answer to this dilemma. Between exceptional measures and the immediacy of 
action on the one hand and the ordinary administrative, police or insurance measures on 
the other, the ‘war on terror’ spans the whole space between the two definitions of 
securitisation. A genealogy of the dispositifs of risk would us allow to understand the 
challenge of the catastrophic and the ‘incalculable’ in relation to the ordinary practices of 
risk management.  
François Ewald’s (1986) and Jacques Donzelot’s (1984) genealogical analyses of 
risk have shown that risk provided a response to the problematisation of specific social 
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and historical problems. Interestingly, the dispositif of risk insurance emerged where 
politics and economics proved incapable of managing social problems. Insurance 
provided an answer to the ‘scandal of the poor’ in the post-revolutionary French 
République, where neither political equality nor capitalism could (Donzelot, 1984). 
Despite equality before the law and equal sovereignty, the poor had no property and were 
therefore forced to sell their labour. Yet, free access to work did not mean the end of 
indigence. The resolution of the social question – impossible through either political 
claims or economic measures – was given in the form of mandatory insurance. Risk 
could convert conflicting demands within the Republic and mitigate the ‘shameful 
opposition between the owners of capital and those who, living only by their labour, 
remain enslaved to them at the same time as they are proclaimed politically sovereign’ 
(Donzelot, 1988: 396). The wage system was the first form of collective risk insurance, 
guaranteeing rights, giving access to benefits outside work and protecting workers from 
the peril of indigence.  
In this context, other social problems of industrial modernity became governed by 
technologies of risk insurance.13 The dispositif of risk insurance emerged out of a 
contestation over means to deal with a social problem and became dominant given its 
non-revolutionary claims in dealing with the social. The discovery of the work accident, 
for example, could have disrupting effects for the social fabric, given its disputable 
claims to responsibility and the exacerbation of questions of exploitation. A rationality of 
risk reformulated accidents as something inherent to work, against which workers could 
however be protected through insurance. Solidarity through insurance could make up for 
the shortcomings of society, compensate for the effects of poverty and reduce the effects 
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of oppression. With insurance, state actions targeted only the forms of social relations 
and not the structures of society. Thus, insurance could ‘modify the relations between 
capital and wage-earners without distorting the historical logic on which they rest, ensure 
a better moralisation of the individual by transforming the social milieu, concretise the 
invisible bond between men of which the State is the visible expression’ (Donzelot, 1988: 
399). The injured, sick or unemployed worker did not need to demand justice before a 
court or by taking to the streets as the proletarians had done in 1848. Instead, the worker 
could be indemnified by the State, the greatest social insurer. Through insurance, workers 
could be protected against unemployment or accidents, in a word, against indigence, the 
great political concern of the century. More generally, the dispositif of risk insurance 
never calls for the reorganisation of society but to compensation of damages caused by 
the social division of labour – and this is not done in the name of a fundamental injustice 
(Donzelot, 1984).  
The dispositif of risk insurance modified the traditional understanding of risk as 
individual responsibility. The classical paradigm of risk was that of prudent individuals 
who negotiated the vicissitudes of fortune on their own and avoided becoming a burden 
on the others. With risk insurance, individuals are no longer directly and solely 
responsible for their fate. The state creates a general principle of responsibility in which 
individuals cannot be disentangled from one another. Yet, with the expansion of 
insurance beyond the wage system, solidarity is simultaneously undermined by the 
division and classification of populations in high risk/low risk groups. As risks of 
muggings, crime, AIDS, cancers, illegal migration all rely on the classification of groups, 
the dispositif of insurance is based upon technologies of dividing and categorising social 
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groups and the statistical computation of probabilities. Risk profiling entered the 
dispositif of insurance by using probabilistic and epidemiological knowledge to identify 
factors associated with risks of certain pathologies (Rose, 2001: 8).  
Risk insurance has undergone further transformations linked with the historical 
context in which its technologies are deployed, on the one hand under the attack of neo-
liberalism and on the other through the challenge of scientific discoveries. The dispositif 
of risk insurance has been contested and transformed by competing representations of 
society and the population, by the knowledge mobilised to support these representations, 
and the new technologies that neo-liberalism deployed. With the rise of neo-liberalism, 
the practice of collective risk management tends to be supplanted by ‘prudentialism’, in 
which subjects are required to prudently calculate, and thereby minimise, the risk that 
could befall them. This does not however reactivate the traditional understanding of risk, 
but redirects the dispositif of insurance towards the individual – hence the reference to 
the notion of ‘new prudentialism’ (O'Malley, 1992: 261). Insurance becomes a matter of 
individual responsibility rather than societal solidarity; it functions like a market which 
individuals enter for the provision of their own security. Thus, neo-liberalism entails a 
shift towards private security arrangements and a rediscovery of individual responsibility.  
The more severe blow to strategies of risk insurance came from the scientific 
discoveries that seemed to undermine the very logic of calculability and the possibility of 
providing calculations for the future (Beck, 1999). As Ewald has succinctly formulated 
this latter challenge, risk ‘tends to exceed the limits of the insurable in two directions: 
toward the infinitely small-scale (biological, natural, or food-related risk), and toward the 
infinitely large-scale (‘major technological risks’ or technological catastrophes’ (Ewald, 
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1993: 222).14 The two ‘infinities’ of risk remind us of Beck’s incalculable risks, the risks 
created by science or civilisation itself. Yet, infinity is not synonymous to incalculability. 
For governmentality, the question becomes one of taming the infinities of risk and 
integrating it within a dispositif of governance.15 After all, the limit of knowledge has 
always confronted insurance technologies. Insurance against risks means making the 
seemingly incalculable subject to calculation (Ericson et al., 2003: 284).  
The infinity of risk is doubly manifested in their potential effects and in their 
‘being’, posing a conundrum for the insurance dispositif. The first element of infinity that 
undermines a politics of insurance is the catastrophic element, the grave and irreversible 
damage that an event can cause. The second element of infinity is that of uncertainty. 
Ewald’s infinitely small or infinitely large-scale risks are both related to scientific 
knowledge. When knowledge is unable to define the prospect of the future, to compute its 
own effects upon the future, the logic of insurance is surpassed (Ewald, 2002). Insurance 
requires the identification of risk and the statistical estimation of an event happening.  
The double infinity of risk, as Beck hypothesised, makes terrorism difficult to 
govern by the technologies of insurance risk. Yet, this does not mean that these 
technologies dwindle out of existence or that governmentality is suspended. Social 
problems are always subjected to the imperative of governmentality. The representation 
of the double infinity of terrorism has led to the emergence of a ‘new’ dispositif of risk, 
precautionary risk, which has been grafted upon the ‘old’ technologies of risk 
management. Despite the similarity to Beck’s uninsurable risks, a Foucauldian approach 
does not portray risks as calculable/incalculable, but rather focuses on ‘how’ presumably 
incalculable catastrophic risks like terrorism are governed. Ewald himself does not speak 
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primarily of catastrophic risks, but of the precautionary paradigm. The precautionary 
dispositif inscribes upon the existing technologies of insurance other forms of calculation 
and relationality to the future. Thus, while Beck is right to argue that strategies of 
insurance risk have been challenged by scientific uncertainty, the governmentality 
literature adds to this insight by (re)conceptualising Beck’s ideas about risk society and 
incalculability in terms of a rationality of government (Rasmussen, 2001: 292, fn. 32).  
Despite its familiar ring, precaution can neither be reduced to traditional 
responsibility in the face of dangers nor to neo-liberal prudentialism. It is not a reminder 
of precautions that must be taken individually by entering on the insurance market. 
Precautionary risk introduces within the computation of the future its very limit, the 
infinity of uncertainty and potential damage. It is therefore exactly the opposite of 
prudence: if the latter recommended what ‘precautions’ to take under conditions of 
knowledge, the former demands that we act under scientific and causal uncertainty. The 
weight of the future is not simply that of contingency, but that of catastrophic 
contingency.  
This new dispositif of risk that has a precautionary rationality at its core is derived 
– much like Beck’s risk society – from environmental politics. The environment was the 
first area where catastrophic events were possible and not scientifically provable. 
Formulated initially within the legal realm, the precautionary principle has its roots in the 
German Vorsorgeprinzip, or foresight principle, which emerged in the early 1970s and 
developed into a principle of German environmental law.16 It has informed international 
policy statements and agreements – initially recognised in the World Charter for Nature, 
which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1982; and subsequently adopted in 
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the First International Conference on Protection of the North Sea in 1984. The European 
Commission, which recognised it for the first time in relation to the environment in the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty, later extended it to other situations (European Commission, 
2000). The definition of the precautionary principle is however most often traced back to 
the 1992 Rio Declaration: ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation’ (United Nations, 1992). 
The precautionary principle asks us ‘to take regulatory action on the basis of 
possible ‘unmanageable’ risks, even after tests have been conducted that find no evidence 
of harm. We are asked to make decisions to curb actions, not on the basis of what we 
know, but on the basis of what we do not know’ (Guldberg, 2003). The European 
Commission’s Communication puts in a nutshell the context for applying the 
precautionary principle: 
  
Whether or not to invoke the Precautionary Principle is a decision exercised 
where scientific information is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and 
where there are indications that the possible effects on the environment, or 
human, animal or plant health may be potentially dangerous and inconsistent 
with the chosen level of protection (European Commission, 2000: 10). 
 
Terrorism is to some extent a ‘risk beyond risk’, of which we do not have, nor cannot 
have, the knowledge or the measure. The precautionary dispositif would apply to 
terrorism where the scientific technologies for ‘representing’ the world find themselves 
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surpassed by reality itself. Unlike insurance which is based upon statistical models of 
reality, precautionary risk ‘applies to what is uncertain – that is, to what one can 
apprehend without being able to assess’ (Ewald, 2002: 286). Precautionary risk has not 
however spelled the death of insurantial risk or of prudentialism. It has reconfigured them 
in a new dispositif that deploys already available rationalities and technologies of risk 
and adds a precautionary element. 
 
IV The new logic of risk: taking precautions against terrorism  
 
Responsible science and responsible policymaking operate on the precautionary 
principle (Blair, 2002). 
 
What, then, is this new dispositif of governing terrorism through risk? We argue that 
precautionary risk has emerged in the dispositif of risk to govern terrorism, where other 
technologies have proven fallible or insufficient. Precautionary risk has modified or 
supplemented other technologies of risk management and has reconfigured them at the 
horizon of the double infinity of terrorism. According to Ewald, ‘the precautionary 
principle does not target all risk situations but only those marked by two principal 
features: a context of scientific uncertainty on the one hand and the possibility of serious 
and irreversible damage on the other’ (Ewald, 2002: 282).17 This double infinity of risk is 
not intrinsic to terrorism, as Beck would probably maintain, but has emerged out of a 
contest over the representation of terrorism.  
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We have seen that a risk dispositif consists of rationalities and technologies to 
monitor and predict dangerous occurrences in the future. Precautionary risk is based on 
four interlinked rationalities that allow for the deployment of specific technologies of 
government: zero risk, worst case scenario, shifting the burden of proof and serious and 
irreversible damage. These rationalities are derived from the catastrophic and radically 
contingent elements of risk and they replace the earlier rationalities of risk insurance: risk 
identification, risk reduction and risk spreading. Any level of risk is now considered 
unacceptable; risk must be avoided at all costs. Risk minimisation and other forms of risk 
management (such as ‘contingency planning’) derive from the joint realisation that the 
catastrophe will happen. The worst case scenario and its irreversible damages logically 
lead to a politics of zero risk which modifies the solidaristic equation that took for 
granted that a risk was acceptable as long as it was reparable or repaired (Ewald, 2002: 
284).  
As a result, the dispositif of insurance has tipped towards drastic prevention. If 
responsibility in insurance was reduced to the case of moral hazards (when the behaviour 
of the insured was likely to lead to risk)18 and was therefore part of the assessment for the 
purpose of compensation, the precautionary principle holds the other responsible for 
‘irreparable damage’. Against immeasurable and irreparable damage, George Bush’s 
‘infinite justice’ gains its full meaning. The sanctioning of those deemed responsible 
becomes itself immeasurable, therefore infinite. From ‘Bin Laden dead or alive’ to 
‘infinite justice’ we discover the whole spectrum of practices activated by risk – from the 
imaginary of vengeance against an individual evil-doer and his accomplices on the model 
of criminal sanctioning and responsibility to the infinite sanctioning of suspects. The 
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debates around pre-emptive strikes, the exceptional status of Guantanamo Bay, practices 
of extraordinary rendition or indefinite detention in the UK appear as technologies 
appropriate to precautionary risk. 
The other does not only harbour a catastrophic risk, but groups of high risk cannot 
be easily detected. If risk management based on insurance technologies could function 
within the horizon of knowledge, precautionary risk faces the limits of knowledge that 
subvert the traditional means of risk management. The insurance paradigm of risk was 
based on scientific calculus and group profiling. Profiling as a technology of ‘social 
sorting’ (Lyon, 2002) depends on the categorisation of social groups, their profiling and 
statistical computation of risk. Once terrorist suspects cannot be clearly identified through 
technologies of profiling, we have a renewed panopticism, forms of surveillance that 
target everybody, as the potential terrorist could be any of us. Gordon Woo, one of the 
best-known risk analysts of the London-based firm Risk Management Solutions has 
formulated this dilemma of the undetectable terrorist: 
 
What would be especially puzzling to security forces is the apparently 
haphazard variation in the commitment of a specific individual to the 
terrorist cause. Such individuals would not be classified as hard-liners, and 
would soon disappear from the terrorist radar screen … These individuals 
may not themselves have any prolonged history of links with radical groups, 
so they would be hard to identify in advance as potential suspects …(Woo, 
2002). 
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The traditional technologies of risk management become more extensive, as 
profiling and surveillance attempt to encompass the whole population (van Munster, 
2004). As the underestimation of intelligence and knowledge is considered irresponsible 
from the viewpoint of precautionary risk, the scope and field of intelligence needs to be 
enlarged accordingly. Yet, at the limit of knowledge, intelligence becomes itself 
insufficient. The Home Office official report on the 7/7 London bombings points out this 
conundrum: nothing marked out the four men involved in the attacks, they were all 
‘unexceptional’ (Home Office, 2006). 9/11 has therefore given way to more pro-active 
forms of surveillance of suspect populations, leading to a surplus supply of data and an 
over-prediction of threats (Lyon, 2003; Levi and Wall, 2004; Amoore and de Goede, 
2005). Precautionary risk management implies the surveillance of all the population, of 
all flights for example, independent of existing intelligence. Hence more and more 
technologies of surveillance are indiscriminately targeted at the whole population: stop 
and search policies in the UK, biometric identifiers or the introduction of identity cards. 
If profiling had a racist effect, targeting surveillance towards racial minorities, the 
governance of terrorism supplements this form of racist profiling with a renewed desire 
for total surveillance. While profiling is still essential in the war on terror, its targets are 
increasingly arbitrary. Beyond categories of religious and ethnic affiliation, all other 
characteristics become blurred. Terrorists can be unemployed or employed, poor or not so 
poor, young or old, legal residents or citizens, illegal migrants or tourists. Uncertainty 
slowly extends profiling to the entirety of the population. 
Precautionary technologies change therefore the relation to social groups, to the 
population as created by the dispositif of insurance. Statistical computation and risk 
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management relied upon the scientific representation of social groups that were to be 
governed; profiling was an important technology for selecting these groups and targeting 
them. At the limit of knowledge, this relation to representation becomes an arbitrary 
connection. Gordon Lafer (2005: 341) has noted that in the United States, Latin 
American immigrants were treated with increased suspicion despite the lack of any 
evidence of a link with terrorist attacks. The link with knowledge can be loosened at the 
horizon of infinite damage and uncertainty. The imperative of zero-risk lead to policies 
such as ‘shoot-to-kill’ in Britain which claimed its first victim immediately after the 7 
July attacks.  
Political decisions can also no longer sustain the imaginary of being grounded in 
the certainties of science, as the precautionary principle severs or rather exposes in its 
contingency the very relation between knowledge and politics. Tony Blair’s response to 
criticism against his position on the war in Iraq brings to light a politics of decision which 
has severed its relation with science, with expertise or with management: 
Sit in my seat. Here is the intelligence. Here is the advice. Do you ignore it? 
But, of course, intelligence is precisely that: intelligence. It is not hard fact. 
It has its limitations. On each occasion, the most careful judgment has to be 
made taking account of everything we know and advice available. But in 
making that judgment, would you prefer us to act, even if it turns out to be 
wrong? Or not to act and hope it’s OK? And suppose we don’t act and the 
intelligence turns out to be right, how forgiving will people be? (Blair, 
2004). 
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Expert knowledge is exposed as an insufficient and unreliable resource for political 
decisions. If the contingency of political decisions could be ‘hidden’ under the weight of 
knowledge and the necessity of expertise, they now reappear as ungrounded, arbitrary 
attempts to subdue the contingency of the future. When the limits of technical or 
scientific knowledge are exposed, politics discloses its own necessary decisionism, its 
immanent limit. Yet, this does not mean that knowledge no longer plays any role in risk 
management, that the imaginary of knowledge grounding politics has been undone. The 
‘managers of unease’, in Bigo’s formulation, always try to use first the already available 
technologies. Blair’s approach to the war in Iraq has wavered between an initial reliance 
on intelligence and a later invocation of the ‘uncertainty’ of this knowledge.  
The rationality of catastrophic risk translates into policies that actively seek to 
prevent situations from becoming catastrophic at some indefinite point in the future. War 
is mobilised alongside other technologies of precaution in a governmental dispositif to 
avoid terrorist irruptions in the future. The ‘war on terror’ or the consequent war of 
Afghanistan and Iraq do not speak of a recent rediscovery of militarism, but of a 
governmentality that activates all the technologies imaginable in the face of uncertainty.19 
Christopher Coker has also pointed out that war is one of option for avoiding the bleak 
promise of the future, for ‘when we do turn to the military option we do so to reduce the 
opportunities for bad behaviour, to prevent them from posing an even greater risk in the 
future’ (Coker, 2002b).  
When faced with the limits of surveillance, biographical profiles, biometric 
identifiers, decisions must be taken beyond the horizon of certainty. The computation of 
the future has become decisional. If evidence is uncertain, the responsibility of the 
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‘suspected terrorist’ is a matter of decision. This decision is no longer the juridical 
decision for which careful consideration of evidence is necessary, but it becomes an 
administrative decision, where the rule of zero risk takes precedence. In this context, it is 
immaterial whether the evidence against the terrorist suspects in the British high-security 
Belmarsh Prison consists of a pair of boots donated to Islamic Chechen rebels or 
something more material (The Observer, 2004). The ‘burden of proof’ is no longer on the 
state to show guilt, but on the prisoners to prove that they are harmless. Their 
responsibility is uncertain and a priori to the event and therefore impossible to 
accommodate by the juridical system. Judgements of responsibility are transferred to the 
sphere of administrative decisions against juridical procedures. The rationality of zero 
risk makes those considered potentially dangerous a priori responsible, subjected to 
administrative measures that are now equivalent to juridical sanctions. The inclusion of 
‘indefinite detention’, ‘house arrest’ as instruments in the UK fight against terrorism, the 
creation of ‘legal limbos’ like Guantanamo captures the inadequacy of law to deal with 
situations of precautionary risk. What counts is a coherent scenario of catastrophic risk 
and imaginary description of the future. The other’s actions are no longer relevant.  
Uncertainty as the ‘limit of knowledge’ has also led to the creative development 
of new technologies of insurance. Although scientific knowledge and the possibility of 
gauging the extent of damages or their probability have been surpassed by the radical 
contingency of catastrophic terrorism, the insurance industry has adjusted and has 
borrowed technologies from a different field, trying to shift insurance risk to the capital 
markets. Even if statistically incalculable, catastrophe risks can still be subsumed to the 
logic of profit: 
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Where the insurer feels that a risk can be handled through an acceptable 
loss ratio, it may be insured regardless of scientific and technological 
uncertainty. This decision depends on the financial condition of each 
insurance company. Indeed, each company will have a different 
definition of catastrophe depending on its loss ratio arrangements and 
financial condition (Ericson and Doyle, 2004: 138).  
 
Beyond the normal strategies of spreading risk to re-insurers and involving the state of 
the ultimate re-insurer, there has been a crossbreeding between risk insurance and the 
capital markets. Through transfer to the capital markets, decisions at the limit of 
knowledge become a form of governmentality. The transferral of precautionary risk to 
the capital market does not just transform the forces of catastrophes into business 
opportunities. Risks are no longer subjected to calculations of frequency and severity but 
to capital market speculations. This ‘governmentality of uncertainty’ (O'Malley, 2003b) 
is derived from an imaginary of ‘expectation’ rather than the imaginary of stable 
prediction upon which insurance relied.20  
Precautionary risk therefore recreates a governmental dispositif at the limit. If 
Beck saw the uninsurability and incalculability of risks as the limit of governmentality, a 
pretence supported by expert systems, a Foucauldian approach understands precautionary 
risk as a dispositif that attempts to ‘tame’ the limit and govern what appears to be 
ungovernable. Thus insurance and its technologies of prevention and compensation are 
adjusted to the double infinity of risk. Profiling and surveillance encompass the whole 
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population. Moreover, everybody is regimented into technologies of vigilance and 
prudentialism. We are not only supposed to monitor our own behaviour, but detect signs 
of risk in the others. Insurance technologies have already incorporated the limits of 
knowledge in the capital markets by means of speculative risks. Yet, when technologies 
of knowledge reach their limit, precautionary risk relies on decision as a technology for 
governing uncertainty.  
In contrast to Beck’s assumption that the risk society will reinvent politics along 
more democratic lines with slow procedures where expertise knowledge is deliberated in 
global public forums (Beck, 1992, 1999), the precautionary principle privileges a politics 
of speed based on the sovereign decision on dangerousness.21 The precautionary 
dispositif of risk reconfigures the debates between securitisation as the introduction of 
speed and urgency at the heart of democracies (Buzan et al., 1998) and a risk-based 
approach that emphasises the everyday practices of bureaucrats and security professionals 
(Bigo, 1996). Decisionism and speed coexist with routines and everyday practices of the 
police, the military, immigration officials and other managers of unease. Moreover, the 
need for urgent decisions at the limit of knowledge removes concerns from the slow 
procedures of law to practices of the administration.22 
 
V Conclusion 
 
This article has argued for a different conceptualisation of risk for security studies, which 
would depart from Beck’s (global) risk society thesis. A governmental analysis of risk 
that pays attention to the modifications and reconfigurations of a dispositif to tackle 
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social problems allows us to understand the multiple and heterogeneous practices that are 
subsumed under the label ‘war on terror’. Technologies of risk management provide a 
logical connector for developments which seem to lack a common rationality and are 
often put down to the actors’ ignorance or interests. We have argued that the ‘war on 
terror’ should be understood through the prism of precautionary risk rather than the 
traditional theoretical lenses of IR. In an attempt to unpack the governmentality of the 
‘war on terror’, the paper took issue with Beck’s view that all practices of security can be 
reduced to one type of risk, explainable within a macro-sociological account of the 
transformation from industrial society to risk society. It has argued that risk is a modality 
of governing and ordering reality, which implies the creation of complex technologies as 
well as political rationalities.  
The dispositif of risk deployed to prevent terrorist events is made possible by the 
representation of terrorism as doubly infinite in its catastrophic effects and the 
uncertainty of its occurrence. Contra Beck, we have shown that the infinity of risk does 
not lead to a democratic politics that debates what is to be done, but to intensified efforts 
and technological inventions on the part of the risk managers to adjust existing risk 
technologies or to supplement them. For a governmental approach, what counts is not 
whether terrorism can be controlled or not, but the dispositif that is being deployed to 
make action upon the contingent occurrence of terrorism thinkable and practicable. 
Technologies of intervening upon the future are always failing; their failure is however 
part of governmentality, the very motor of the continuous requirement for new 
technologies and more knowledge. Governing terrorism through risk entails drastic 
prevention at the catastrophic horizon of the future as well as generalised and arbitrary 
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surveillance at the limit of knowledge. New technologies such as biometrics are supposed 
to enlist everybody under the category of suspicion. The possibility of irreparable damage 
severs suspicion from knowledge. Thus, suspected terrorists can be indefinitely detained 
independent of any evidence that exists against them. The contingency of knowledge 
leads to technologies of new prudentialism, of responsibilising and regimenting 
everybody in the war on terror. Citizens are to be vigilant, attentive to any sign of 
suspicious behaviour.  
While a governmental analysis of risk is an agenda to be explored and debated in 
security studies, we have suggested that such an analysis brings a different perspective 
upon the debates in security studies. Through the perspective of risk management, 
securitisation is shown to function through the deployment of technologies to manage 
dangerous irruptions in the future. Yet, the limit of knowledge and catastrophe mobilised 
in the precautionary dispositif introduces a decisionistic form of politics as a form of 
governmentality of the future. The dilemma of exceptionalism versus routinisation in 
security studies can therefore be reformulated as their coexistence in different 
configurations depending of the dispositif of risk deployed to manage particular social 
problems.  
Although the emergence of a dispositif of precautionary risk entails a series of 
modification in how (in)security is governed, these modifications are subject to 
contestation. The parameters of contestation and of what it means to govern (in)security 
and risk have however shifted and a dispositif of precautionary risk raises a number of 
conundrums about the formulation of a critical stance in the ‘war on terror’. Political 
interventions have mostly focused on the relation to knowledge that the ‘war on terror’ 
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presupposes. The ‘worst case scenario’ of Iraq possessing or intending to use weapons of 
mass destruction or the catastrophic potential of terrorist attacks have all been questioned. 
Charles Tilly (2005) has ironically noted that Al-Quaeda is not the World Bank. As they 
require extensive funding and training, attacks of the magnitude of 9/11 are not easily 
replicable by smaller organisations or individuals. Yet, challenges that invoke knowledge 
as a critique appear increasingly powerless when confronted with the politics of decision 
as a technology of taming the limit. It is the very imbrication of knowledge and decision 
at the limit, of the arbitrary sovereign decision and its grounding in ‘objective’ socio-
economic configurations that challenges political engagement and resistance against the 
practices of the ‘war on terror’ to develop forms of accountability that take precautions 
against a precautionary politics of arbitrary decisions at the limit of knowledge. 
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1
 This article was initially written in the framework of the COST Action A24 ‘The Evolving Social 
Construction of Threats’. We would like to thank the participants of the COST seminar ‘Constructing Risk, 
Identity and Violence’, 9-10 June 2005, Vilnius as well as the participants of the ISA workshop ‘Governing 
by Risk in the War on Terror’, 21 March, San Diego for their helpful comments. We also benefited 
substantially from the suggestions made by the two anonymous referees.  
2
 On this distinction, see Bigo’s (2002a, fn. 26) editorial in Cultures et conflits. Huysmans (1998) has also 
criticised the Copenhagen School for the limitation of the logic of security. 
3
 The criminology literature which has applied risk analysis to the war on terror has regarded it as a pretext 
for the expansion of risk management, surveillance and control throughout society (Mythen and Walklate, 
2005: 13-4). Yet, it is important not to formulate post-9/11 developments in ‘incendiary terms, which serve 
only to collapse arguments about risk into a political ideology – neo-conservatism – and reduce them to a 
form of warmongering’ (Runciman, 2004). Contra the criminological literature, we consider practices of 
surveillance and control alongside war as technologies in a dispositif of precautionary risk. 
4
 Despite the peril of exoticism, Foucault’s coinage ‘dispositif’ has been preserved as such in English 
contexts due to the perceived inadequacy of translations such as mechanism and apparatus. Neither 
equivalent could account for the heterogeneity that dispositifs imply.  
5
 Although Luhmann’s distinction between uncertainty and risk captures the important point that risk is a 
way of colonising and calculating the future, his view of risk as the outcome of a personal choice only 
captures the responsibility paradigm of risk (see section III). In this paradigm, subjects are stimulated to 
behave prudently by ranking the foreseeable effects of their behavioural alternatives. However, as Ewald 
(1986) has pointed out, risk also plays an important role on the collective level through the socialisation of 
responsibility (see also Wæver, 2002). This dissolves the subjective/objective distinction insofar as 
objective threats (e.g., the accident at work) are rendered calculable in collective insurance schemes which 
operate independently from individual choices, but at the same time also seeks to regulate and discipline 
individual conduct (e.g., by prescribing workers to wear a helmet on the work floor). 
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6
 Rasmussen (2001: 292, fn. 32) does not elaborate on what enables a constructivist approach or what such 
an interpretation would entail. In our opinion, however, Beck’s account of risk cannot be distinguished 
from his wider sociological account of reflexive modernity. Risk society and reflexive modernity are two 
sides of the same coin. In fact, Rasmussen’s claim that risks can also be socially constructed would seem to 
render Beck’s conceptualisation of risk as a material and objective effect of reflexive modernity largely 
irrelevant. 
7
 Here, the risk society thesis comes close to the conceptualisation of risk in cultural studies or cognitive 
studies, which also have investigated the role of perception in explaining responses to risk (e.g., Douglas, 
1992; Sjöberg, 2001).  
8
 Guzzini (2000) has pointed out that social constructivism is defined not just by the social construction of 
knowledge but also by the social construction of reality. While a more culturally sensitive reading of the 
risk society thesis may be possible, this does not entail a move towards constructivism. 
9
 Beck is only able to tackle migration within a parallel theoretical framework. The distinction first 
modernity/second modernity is not just that between the welfare state and the risk society, but becomes also 
a distinction between nation-state modernity and cosmopolitan modernity. Rather than a risk, migration 
bespeaks of the cosmopolitan age (Beck, 2000a; 2005). Migration or labour mobility are also considered in 
relation to global economic inequalities, in a retrieval of the economic that had been superseded in the 
theory of risk society as a democratic exposure to risks.  
10
 Huysmans (2004a) has analysed the securitisation of free movement in terms of rationalities and 
technologies of government. 
11
 Ole Waever (2002) has discussed the semantic differentiation of ‘dangers’ and ‘risks’. If one moves from 
word/text to ideas, how to analyse risk is less straightforward.  If risk is understood however as a dispositif 
of tackling social problems, it is less important whether the late modern society perceives itself as ‘risk 
society’. Risks become such through interventions upon the real. 
12
 See Bigo’s work on the security professionals and their technologies of risk management (1996; 2002b; 
2004a). 
13
 Beck rejects the idea that the ‘insurance state’ is part of risk society as it is concerned with the 
distribution of ‘goods’ and not of ‘bads’, i.e. modernisation risks (O’Malley (2001).  
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14
 Of course, it depends on cultural and social dispositions which risks are qualified as catastrophic. See 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982). 
15
 We borrow the term taming from Ian Hacking’s (1990) formulation, ‘the taming of chance’ in relation to 
probabilities and statistical laws. 
16
 Whereas the German word ‘Vorsorge’ (foresight) refers to the precautionary principle, the insurantial 
model of solidarity is best described in German as ‘Umsorge’ (taking care, caring). 
17
 Ewald sees the possibility of the precautionary principle being exported outside its original territory 
(1999). Baker (2002) and Sunstein (2005) claim that the precautionary principle increasingly permeates 
other forms of risk as well. 
18
 See Ericson and Doyle (2003) on risk and morality. 
19
 This approach is at odds with the criminological literature which sees the ‘war on terror’ as having 
triggered intensified surveillance and extended prevention. 
20
 For an empirical discussion of the crossbreeding of insurance and capital markets in catastrophe risks, 
see Bougen (2003) and (Ericson and Doyle 2004). The cross-fertilization between the insurance industry 
and the capital market has given rise to new networks of institutional risk communication and analysis. 
Bougen, for instance, shows how re-insurers are repackaging catastrophic risks as investment opportunities 
for financial speculators on the capital market, bringing together re-insurers, scientists and speculators. 
Ericson and Doyle, illustrating how the uncertainty of actuarial knowledge has led to speculative 
underwriting in the insurance industry, also show how, in the case of life insurance, the insured are brought 
to the capital market by letting choose between different products that all involve some sense of speculation 
(investment bonds, equity market index funds, flexible interest rates, and so on).  
21
 On securitisation as decisionism and politics of speed, see Huysmans (2004b) and Aradau (2004b). 
22
 Scheuerman (2004) offers a pertinent discussion of the challenges that a politics of speed and social 
acceleration pose for liberal democracies. 
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